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SOVIET CIVIL LAW: A REVIEW*
Roscoe Poundt

ERE is an excellent and much needed book. Although the enthusiastic wishful thinking about things Russian, fashionable
not so long ago, has for the most part abated, the rise of a new social
and economic order on a great scale must call for careful study by
lawyers and law-makers no less than by historians and economists and
students of politics. Now that a generation has been at work constructively since the destructive era of militant communism after the revolution, we need accurate and objectively presented and interpreted
information as to how the administration of justice goes on under "the
dictatorship of the proletariat," whether or how far it shows what have
been the characteristics of all rule by dictators, how the new problems
created by the new order have been or are being met, how far what
experience has shown to be the reasonable expectations incident to life
in a civilized society are being met, and how extreme of bureaucratic
adjustment of relations and ordering of conduct operates with respect
to those expectations. One need not lay himself open to a charge of
answering these questions in tp.e way he puts them by speaking of
"rights." At any rate, as Llewellyn has so well shown, any organization
of mankind which fails to achieve an adjustment taking reasonable
care of them sooner or later dissolves. These are the questions to which
Dr. Gsovski's book is addressed, and he treats them understandingly,
accurately, and with moderation, not with a brief for or against the
Soviet legal order but as a thoughtful student of comparative law. In
his own words, his method has been to "inquire into the legal protection and actual exercise of private rights in the Soviet Union, on the
basis of an examination of the authentic soviet sources."1
A recent reviewer complains that Dr. Gsovski neglects the new
techniques developed under the soviets to secure efficiency in an order
based on public ownership and a planned economy and speaks of a

H

,. SovmT Crv.rL LAw: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THEIR BACKGROUND UNDER TBE SovmT
R.EGIMl!. By Vladimir Gs011ski. Two volumes. Vol. I: Comparative Survey, xxxvii, 909;
Vol. II: Translation, xx, 907. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School. 1948,

· 1949. $15.

t University Professor Emeritus, Harvard; formerly Dean of the Harvard Law School;
Visiting Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.-Ed.
1 Vol. I, xiv.
2 Rashba in 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 921 (1950).
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"novel two-faced system, involving concepts which we have not learned
about in law schools."3 But the so-called new techniques are largely
distortions of techniques frequently going back to the beginnings of
law and long outgrown. For the rest the technique is chiefly one ·of
ruthless penal treatment by an administrative type of criminal law
enforcement and arbitrary determination, typically without appeal, by
bureau officials. One need not doubt that the simple, inexpensive
procedure of arbitrators with mixed characteristics of courts and administrative agencies has, as the reviewer tells us, disposed of 65 per cent
of the hundreds of thousands of cases that have arisen in less than fifteen days and more than 25 per cent in less than a month. 4 The
method of these arbitrators, whose decisions are final, no appeal being
permitted, but only an ex officio review if the arbitrator in chief or administrative agency to which the trial arbitrator is attached chooses at
his own initiative to make it,5 is nothing novel in administrative law.
It has called for legislation with us and to setting up of judicial administrative reviewing tribunals elsewhere in the world. It is not a new
legal device invented in Russia, although carried there to an extreme.
Nor are the "new forms of documents with new legal characteristics" 6
which have had to be devised to meet the requirements of banking,
where substantial payments of cash are prohibited, anything more than
a type of device for doing what in experience must be done but is not
allowed to be done according to law which the soviet polity has continually been calling for.
I can vouch with assurance for the accuracy of Dr. Gsovski's statements, the moderation and soundness of his conclusions, and the fairness with which he lets facts speak for themselves. When, iri 1946,
I was appointed Adviser to the Minister of Justice of the Republic of
China, it was suggested to me that I ought to make a study of soviet
law where it was supposed there must be much worth taking into
account in the task of restoring the administration of justice after eight
years of enemy occupation. I was prepared to find much suggestive
for the law of today in fresh handling of old principles in new forms,
in development of new techniques and in working out of new principles
and development of new doctrines. I have gone over, in reading Dr.
Gsovski's book, some hundred pages of notes I then made. What I
found is what Dr. Gsovski found and sets forth and the reviewer in
aJd. at 923.
-1 Ibid.
5 See 1 Gsovski, 873 with cited references. Hereafter page references are to volume L
6 63 HARv. L. RBv. 921 at 924 (1950).
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the Harvard Law Review reproaches him for finding: "A system . . .
inconsistent and self-contradictory," _a "monster rather than a new
species." 7 The words are the reviewer's. But they describe what the
data Dr. Gsovski furnishes amply come to. The difficulty seems to be
what Krylenko pointed out with respect to one abandoned soviet experiment: To carry out many of the soviet plans "it would be necessary to
remake human nature." There is a deep-seated human unwillingness
to subject one will to the arbitrary will of another. This is abundantly
testified to by the drastic extreme penalties, constantly resorted to, by
which the working of the soviet polity has to be assured.
No doubt allowance must be made for want of traditional background and inevitable experimental trial and error in working out a
legal system for a regime of complete state ownership and officially
planned and administered economy. Neverthe~ess, as one studies soviet
law as it has developed there seems to stand out something deeper and
more significant to account for its inconsistencies, confusion, and frequent crudities. A conception of individuals in a modern civilized
society as "soldiers on a production front, subject to admonition and
order,"8 with duties but not rights, expected to obey blindly, and to
leave initiative to official superiors, is so at conflict with deep-seated
human urges that all attempts to work out its requirements for adjusting
relations and ordering conduct into a legal system continually encounter
obstacles in human nature calling for compromises and evasions, and
coverings up of withdrawal from declared principles. Liberty is at a
discount in so-called advanced thinking of the time. But the human
demand for self assertion is an obstinate fact which a legal system cannot ignore.
Dr. Gsovski shows a grasp of Anglo-American law unusual in
jurists of Continental training. This along with his clear understanding of Continental civil law and juristic theory makes his translation
accurate and so exceptionally useful. For example, he understands
when to translate Recht as "law" and not as "right" and to distinguish
"law," "laws," and "a 1aw." 9 Also h e sees that soviet
· anaIytica
· l theory
comes from German Pandectists and Allgemeine Rechtslehre and not
from England.10 But he knows Austin.
Volume I, Comparative Survey, which must be chiefly considered,
is followed in Volume II by a body of translations of codes, statutes, decrees, edicts, r~olutions of the Council of Ministers, instructions pro7 Id. at 923.
SJbid.

9 P.

179 and note 78, pp. 179-180.
180.

10 Ibid.
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mulgated by ministries, standard rules, standard char"ters, and standard
agreements and contracts, with commentary and a full bibliography.
Thus the soviet legal materials are left to speak for themselves. There
is nothing propagandist in Dr. Gsovski's method.
In the general survey there are two excellent chapters on the political, economic, and legal development down to 1936 followed by a
chapter on the present economic order and one on the present soviet
order. They are a prelude to the chapter on the soviet theory of private
law, and the role of the judiciary, which lead to chapters on special
topics: Three on rights under soviet law, one on legal entities, two on
contracts, two on torts and theory of liability, one on property, one on
inheritance, four on agrarian legislation and the collective farm, and
two on courts and civil procedure. From this general survey we can
see how the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has developed the characteristics of all rule by dictatorship. Achievement of a social democracy
through dictatorship of the proletariat has proved to mean giving up of
individual liberty, local self-government, and majority rule. There was
to be a classless society. But an official bureau and military caste has
grown up, "resurrecting even the insignia of the Tsar." A revolution
which was to deliver labor, industrial and agricultural, from exploitation has resulted in a system of forced service, arbitrarily fixed and penally enforced wages, compulsory attainment of planned production,
maintained by administrative criminal law with no effective appeal.
"Imposition of heavy penalties by nonjudicial bodies is a part of the
soviet penal system."11 Indeed a system of secret statutes, officially
withheld from publication, held over from the imperial regime, and
"recent practices give ample examples of withholding important statutes from printing in the official law gazettes."12 We can see the extreme of bureaucratic administration of justice in action. Thus the
Ministry of the Int~rior has jurisdiction of a category of criminal cases
with no review by the supreme court.18 A number of categories of civil
disputes are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the courts and assigned
to administrative authorities, e.g., assignment and withdrawal of use of
land, expulsion from a collective farm, eviction from certain kinds of
houses, and application of disciplinary codes.14 Certain crimes committed by civilians, such as treason, espionage, subversive activities, are,
under normal peace time conditions tried by the military tribunals. DisllP.236.
12P.229.

1sp. 836.
14 P.

837.
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putes between government owned enterprises are disposed of by official
trial arbitrators from whose decision there is no appeal. We can see
likewise the extreme of government control in action. If an invention
is deemed of special importance to the state, the Council of Ministers
may decree a mandatory transfer giving exclusive right to the government with remuneration according to a schedule. As Dr. Gsovski puts
it, "unsel6.sh surrender of his interests to the benefit of the State is
expected from a soviet inventor."15 The writer is no better off than the
inventor. Indeed he is worse off. He must not even write except in
the political interest of officialdom. "Our literature," says a commentator upon a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party in 1946, "is not a private enterprise designed to serve various
tastes of the market. . . . We demand that our comrades, who are the
leaders of literature, . . . be guided by something without which the
soviet regime cannot exist, that is, politics. . . ."16 The government
machine tractor stations, which own all important agricultural machinery, tractors, combination reapers, threshing machines, and supervise
their operation in the collective farms, were set up and are maintained
as an instrument of party control. They have special political sections
and later had special political assistant directors. Sound political thinking is held no less important in the collective farm than efficient production.17
What is the idea of law under such a regime? Vishinsky said in
1935 that there might be discrepancies and collisions between the
commands of laws and the demands of the proletarian revolution. They
must, he said, ''be solved by the subordination of the formal commands
of law to those of party policy."18 He defined law thus: "Law is a
general body of such rules of conduct, expressing the will of the ruling
class as are established by legislation, and of such customs and rules of
community life as are sanctioned by the government power, the application of which body of rules is secured by the .coercive force of the
State for the protection, consolidation, and development of the social
relations and the public order, beneficial and desirable for the ruling
class."19 The civil law text book of 1944, issued by two law institutes,
one attached to the ministry of justice and the other to the Russian
Academy of Sciences, simplifies it thus: "Law is a body of rules of
15 P.

603.

16 Pp. 616-617.
17 Pp. 751, 758-759.

1sp. 163.
19 P.176.
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human conduct established or sanctioned by the government power,
the execution of which rules is secured by the coercive power of the
State."20 This extreme analytical doctrine is what. one would expect
in an absolutist state. It goes on to express dissatisfaction with the term
"civil law" and object to the term "private law" saying that in a capitalist
society civil law protects private rights and allows a certain amount of
freedom and autonomy to the individual in contrast to administrative
law, criminal law, and other branches of public law "in which mandatory rules of law are predorninant."21 In this connection it should be
borne in mind what or who is the state. "Comrade Stalin," says a textbook of administrative law in 1945, "teaches that the Communist Party
directs the government· machinery. The Communis·t Party through its
members working in the government agencies guides their work and
directs their activities."22 Accordingly, writers have not hestitated to
lay down that resolutions of the central committee of the party may
be ''both party directives and soviet law."23 What law really amounts
to in such a regime is shown by the caliber of the judges who administer
it. We are told that of about one hundred members of the supreme
court of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1946 there was not
one lawyer of prominence.24
As one might expect in such a polity, a notable feature is the complete lack of any separation of powers and repudiation of checks and
balances of any sort. The form of the law is thoroughly confused. All
the highest governmental bodies, the Supreme Soviet, its Presidium,
and the Council of Ministers, proceed on what seems an equal basis
upon all current administrative and legislative problems, including
constitutional amendments. "The more recent act is enforced, even
in preference to one issued earlier by an authority which, under the Constitution, controls the authority enacting such later act." 211 Hence it is
often difficult in the confused and often conflicting source material to
say with assurance what the law is. What holds the system together
is the directing power of the Communist party. Its Central Committee
has passed resolutions amounting to direct orders addressed to governmental bodies. Also it addresses resolutions to individual government
departments and government enterprises, and such resolutions may repeal otherwise binding rules, and have not been pronounced illegal by
20lbid.
21p.2O1.
22p. 77.

28P.214.
24P.269.
25p. 75.
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soviet writers. This explains how the system may work. The decisions
are made at the real top of the scale no matter to what agency of government they are directed or in what capacity they are directed. The governing authority of the party is not bound by any law, but it can tell
the law makers and law administrators what to enact and what to apply.26 Even so, it happens only a few principles .of a general nature can
be established assuredly. Soviet writers tell us that the law about regulations as to rent and space allowed to a tenant of one holding by building tenancy is to be found in "hundreds of still effective decrees, orders
of government departments, directives, and interpretations by local authorities, which were issued over a period of more than ten years and
are not in accord with one another," so that when one appearing applicable is found, the main difficulty begins, namely, whether it is still in
force and whether it has been amended. 27 Nor is it easy to say what is
the effect of judicial decisions as determining the law under the soviet
system. According to the Text Book of 1944 only principles continuously applied by the courts or announced in "instructive rulings," i.e.,
directives to the lower courts, passed by a plenary session of the Supreme Court of the Union, are to be regarded as sources (i.e., forms) of
law.28
One significant feature, however, stands out, namely, the persistence
and resurgence of certain universal juristic ideas. Thus fault as the
basis of liability ultimately held its ground despite attempts to visit loss
upon an involuntary good Samaritan or on the basis of comparative
need.29 Also an action for reparation of injuries done by one collective
farmer to another came to be allowed.30 In summing up the soviet law
of torts Dr. Gsovski says truly: "It seems that particular protection of
the State but not of the poor, and a restricted method of computation of
damages in instances of bodily injury, are the only striking features of
the soviet law of torts in actual operation. But these features make the
soviet law less beneficial than the capitalist law for the person injured."31
Likewise, after much experimentation to reject the Continental civil
law doctrine of dividing the loss in case of what, at common law, we
call contributory negligence, soviet law had to come back to the rule of
the modem Roman law, which seems to have been proved by experience since the classical Roman jurists, a rule, it is interesting to note,
26 Pp.

76-79.

27P.459.
2s P. 268.

29
30
31

Pp. 494, 499.
P. 534.
P. 554.
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not unlike one to which we seem to be coming by legislation both in
the United States and in Canada. 32 Again, after confident attempts to
reject the law of inheritance the soviet law has had to come back to
much of it as it had established itself as general law throughout the
civilized world. The tenacity of inheritance as a legal institution suggests also that a right of succession is something deeply rooted in the
human mind. It has withstood the challenge in the original provisions
of soviet law, it has withstood the teachings of soviet legislators and
jurists, who expected the legal order to get along without it, and has
increasingly grown to the pattern of the general law.33 The same
phenomenon is to be seen in the law of property where it might have
been least expected. The abolition of private ownership of land "made
it necessary to create substitutes for it in the- form of building tenancy
and toil tenure." 34 Dr. Gsovski's conclusion as to the effect of recent
changes is amply justified and is worth quoting: "... many old values
have been rediscovered and certain old legal institutions restored. . . .
No legal restriction is imposed upon private ownership of properties
serving immediate needs and personal comforts. Certain security
granted in respect to the tenure of houses and land, affords some substitute for ownership. The profit motive is recognized as a legitimate incentive to the business efficiency of an individual, provided his activities fit the economic framework designed by the government. Inequality in remuneration according to personal contribution is the cornerstone of the economic system, and economic inequality resulting from
it is not considered unjust. Inequality in social standing and the beginning of the formation of caste-like groups is also in evidence."35
Thus soviet law has in a generation moved significantly back from its
extreme beginnings. .
Some examples of the effect of persistent pressure of individual
instinctive claims may be noted in this connection. Under a number of
acts of 1945 and 1946 members of the Academy of Sciences may be
assigned lots for building suburban cottages, and generals, admirals,
and senior officers, retired after twenty-five years of service, and technical personnel of certain factories may be assigned lots for building
houses which will be privately owned by them. 36 Again, originally in
soviet law, distribution in intestate succession was per capita. But the
legislation of 1935 establishes distribution per stirpes as to descendPp. 519-522.
Pp. 655, 656.
34 Pp. 556, 577.
32
33

35 P.149.
36

P. 587.

SovmT CIVIL LAw: A

1951]

REVIEW

103

ants. 37 Here once more we see how ideas which have developed in the
history of law and have become universal come back into the law in
Russia after a generation. These ideas seem to respond to reasonable
expectations of life in civilized society and to illustrate Kohler's doctrine of jural postulates of civilization. For another example, when in
1929 the government set out to eliminate the independent farmer, what
was called toil tenure for millions of peasants came to an end and tenure
by the collective farm developed. But the collective farms did not fulfill the government's expectations. The collective farms were either
inefficient and had no surpluses to be requisitioned or were not willing
to give them up. Or surpluses were stored under pretext of permitted
reserves. Stalin complained that psychologically the farmers remained
private owners. There was no incentive for the farmer on the collective
farm to work. The result was famine in 1932-1933. New penalties were
resorted to. But the collective farms had to be reorganized to stimulate the personal interest of the farmer and yet tie his personal welfare
to the collective farm. The present law of collective farms grew out
of this situation.38 It is another example of how continually the communist regime has failed because of giving no incentive to the individual productive energy which the economy of a large population demands. One of the three forms of collective farms, called artel became
the official standard. Originally the income was divided per capita regardless of the contributions of the members in labor and goods. Later
when a model charter was provided for the artel a section prescribed
that "the remuneration for the labor of the members of the commune
shall be made in proportion to the quantity and quality of labor spent
and work done in the communal economy by a member." The commune was finally abandoned in 1930 when the artel became the official
type. Thus here too there had to be a movement away from pure communism. 30 But the soviet textbook of 1935 on the law of collective
farms recognizes that the scheme has not worked smoothly and recites
a long and suggestive list of failures. Also the preambles to laws dealing with the subject point out continual departures on a large scale. 40
Need of compromise with announced principles, of abandoning
attempts at radical rejection of universal doctrines, and of constant
changes and amendments to conform to pressure of obstinate human
urges has led to much that may well be called window dressing in soviet
31 Pp.

637, 638.

ss Pp. 717-719.

sopp. 719, 723, 741-742.
40 Pp.724-725.
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legal and juristic writing. A few examples will suffice. Much in soviet
legal procedure that seems novel to the Anglo-American lawyer is
staple in the doctrine and procedure of the continental civil law. Very
little creative ingenuity has been shown in taking it over. Mostly
there is a not too ingenious sophistical endeavor to show that the doctrines and procedures adopted from continental law have been somehow socialized. Often it has been put to new uses but remains essentially the same. Often there is merely boastful terminology, as, for
instance, in the constant use of "interests of the toiling masses" to mean
interests of the bureaucracy which have to be upheld at the expense of
farmers and industrial laborers by extreme penal treatment summarily
administered without appeal. Again, in the textbook of 1944 a distinction is made between the soviet state as the owner of all economic resources, including those managed by governmental legal entities, and
the treasury (fisc, in Russian Kazna). In continental law, adopted from
Roman law, the term "treasury" (fisc) is applied to the state when acting not as sovereign but as holder of rights and of obligations. Accordingly, diverse governmental commercial enterprises would belong in
this category. But according to the textbook soviet governmental legal
entities engaged in business are not a part of the soviet treasury although they would be in capitalist countries. It is clear enough that
the highly artificial use of the legal conception "fisc" (treasury) was
intended to give a theoretical foundation for soviet refusal to be bound
by transactions of its e}..'POrt-import organizations. There is a typical
case of juristic window dressing in the use of the term "contract" in
soviet law. In its widest sense contract is used for legal transaction, a
declaration of intention to bring about a possible and permissible result to which the law, recognizing the intention, gives the effect of requiring the intended result. The soviet regime carries what Josserand
called "contractual dirigism" to the extreme. With free private enterprise excluded, there is room only for hazy and artificial legal constructions purporting to bring the complex relations among government
agencies under the idea of contract. Thus officially initiated and
planned activities to which individuals are constrained by force get the
good will of the term, "contract." In the same spirit, the constitution
(section 4) announces that "private ownership of the instrull_lents and
means· of production is abolished." It then in section 10 proceeds to
announce protection of "personal ownership" by the citizen. As Dr.
Gsovski says, the new term "personal ownership," used in the constitu-
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tion, has made a problem for the Soviet jurists.41 In truth it is another
bit of window dressing to hide survival or restoration of secured interests of substance in contravention of the sweeping declaration that they
are abolished.
A distinction between the means of production and "consumers'
goods" is now made by soviet jurists as giving a guiding principle for
the soviet law of property. They now recognize ownership as a permanent institution of human society. They say, however, that in
socialist society there is no "capitalist private ownership." There is
"socialist ownership" of the instruments and means of production and
"personaI ownersh·Ip" of consumers' goo ds. Th·IS "persona1 ownersh·Ip,"
they assert, is something wholly different from private ownership in a
capitalist polity.42 But the distinction they profess to make is not carried out consistently and is simply window dressing. The term "consumers' goods" by no means covers all the objects which individuals
are allowed to own. "Auxiliary household economy" and a dwelling
house can be called "consumers' goods" only in a very stretched sense.
"Earned income and savings" are as much means of production as "consumers' goods," and this category is made to cover winnings from government lotteries, and bonds with prizes, interest on money deposited
in government banks, Stalin's prizes, royalties of authors, and remunerations of inventors. All these kinds of income are protected by soviet
law. Moreover the division of objects into instruments of production
and objects of consumption does not provide for things used in the
performance of services such as means of shipping and of conveyance.
These are neither means of production nor articles of consumption.
Also a peasant household in a collective farm may hold "in personal
ownership" a dwelling house, a house and garden plot, and "such livestock, other than draught animals, poultry, and minor agricultural implements, as are compatible with the charter of the collective farm." 48
Limitations on the jus utendi of an owner have been steadily increasing throughout the capitalist world but have not been taken to require
setting up of a new category of ownership. As Dr. Gsovski says truly,
the theory of ownership in consumers' goods and consequent category
of "personal ownership" are "more a slogan of economic policy than
an operative legal principle. The limitations imposed upon one or another type of ownership open to the soviet citizen are not governed by
nP.565.
42 Pp. 567-568.

48

Pp. 567-569, 571-572.
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this principle."44 Likewise as to the powers characteristic of different
types of soviet ownership, "the soviet jurists simply evade calling a spade
a spade. They prefer to call limited powers, powers with a limited content."45
Another example of· window dressing may be seen in the doctrine
of "property not part of the estate" so as to escape the limitations on
testamentary disposition. It was provided that government loans deposited in government banks, and savings accounts, were exempt from the
limitations upon inheritance. This included insurance premiums, a
number of kinds of government loans, stocks and bonds and other deposits in government banks. They are pronounced not part of the
estate. The owner may dispose of such assets freely, not by a will but
by a written assignment addressed to the bank indicating the person to
whom the deposit shall be paid after death of the depositor.46 A generation ago the soviet regime began by abolition or confiscation of all accumulated private wealth. Today legal theory allows unlimited accumulation of private wealth if deposited in certain government banks.47
Indeed the same sort of window dressing may be seen in recent new
"interpretations" showing a changed attitude toward inheritance.
Yet another example may be seen in the organization of the collective farm. The charter gives the appearance of organization on a democratic basis. The chairman is supposed to be elected by the general
meeting of the members, which is·called "the supreme authority in the
management of the artel." But in fact the chairman, as director and
chief executive, is the manager and is by no means actually freely
chosen by the members. We are told in the 1940 text book that where
no suitable chairman can be elected from among the members the
district authorities send in candidates from the outside. Also it tells
us that in one farm, after two chairmen of its own choice at the beginning, all successors were invariably sent in by the district authorities.
Administrative control of these farms stands out clearly. It is admitted that local administrators go beyond the powers granted them·by law.
The collective farms are supposed to function freely. But they are also
supposed to exercise their freedom in following the plans of the government. The organization and management of a collective farm set forth
in the standard charter is an ideal scheme only.48
44 P.

572.

45P. 575.

46P.632.

47P. 633.
48 P. 759.
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A striking example may be seen in the law as to wages. In order
to attain the minimum pay provided for in the schedule a worker must
maintain the standard output. Under the labor code the stan'dards of
output for each job are to be established by agreement between the
administration of the agency managing the job and the trade union.
Actually new standards of output and new rates are approved by the
directors of individual plants upon the recommendation of the heads
of the shops and are immediately put in effect. In some instances standards of output and rates are directly enacted by the council of ministers
which has legislative agthority. Thus the trade unions, though controlled by the government and the communist party, have nothing to
say in fixing the chief element in determining wages. The resumption
of collective agreements, announced in 1949, does not alter the fact
that the decisive voice in fixing standards of output is still in the top
government agencies. 40
Finally, although the Judiciary Act of 1938 provides for direct
election of people's judges and assessors (associate judges)' by the constituency of the district, no such elections at last accounts had been had.
Election is done by the local soviets. 50
Indeed a certain juristic na'ivete seems characteristic of soviet law
writers. This has been evident in the attempt to find a new method of
interpretation in the writings of Marx and Lenin and discussions of the
place of custom in sources of law,51 in what Dr. Gsovski justly calls
"highly spurious constructions," and in the attempts to get away from
the definition of sale in the Civil Code to make it apply to bookkeeping
transactions. 52 Not infrequently the thinking is confused, as, for example, on the question of loss of profits as a measure of damages, where,
to use Dr. Gsovski's words, soviet legal thought in theJ949 textbook
"was hopelessly lost."63 Often there are downright crudities, as in ap-plication of code rules manifestly made to govern in torts to damages
due to nonperformance of an obligation,54 and resort to slogans rather
than economic realities.55 Opportunities for juristic creative skill in
connection with appeals and "reopenings" have not been improved.56
Soviet juristic ingenuity has not been manifest in law. Such ingenuity
as is manifest has been displayed rather in setting up administrative
49 Pp. 812-813.
50 Pp. 836-839.
51 Pp. 218-224;
52 Pp. 452-454.

53P.444.

230-232.

54 Pp. 510,511,513.
55 Pp. 454; 724.
56 This appears notably

Appeals and Reopenings.

in chapter 24,
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and bureau hierarchies. It must be added, however, that in studying
recent soviet juristic writing I got a feeling, which is confirmed by Dr.
Gsovski, that one writer, the late Professor Agarkov, showed distinct
power of developing systematic doctrine on the basis of soviet legal
materials and a sound and wide acquaintance with general juristic literature. Yet on the whole there is much to suggest that a regime of
official initiative and official planned and coerced individual activity
does not conduce to bringing forth jurists.
Despite protestations to the contrary, much has been borrowed
from the general law of continental Europe and not a little from the prerevolutionary imperial law. The soviet conception of law has been
taken from the nineteenth century analytical jurists.57 Section 1 of
the Civil Code derives from Saleilles (1904), Gustav Schwarz (1908),
and Duguit (1911).58 Section 406 is borrowed from a section in the
draft German Code (1887), a section omitted, however, in the final
draft (1896).59 The model of civil procedure is the general continental
civil procedure, the difference being not in the procedure itself but in
the position of the soviet court and the principles of administering justice. 60 Also the general course of proceeding as to evidence is that of
civil law countries. 61 The model of codes since the German Code which
took effect in 1900 is followed by "enacting-laws" (Einfuhrungsgesetze)
in the Soviet Codes. But in these borrowings there have often been
very crude endeavors to dispense with what universal experience had
shown as to how to adjust relations in civilized society. These have required successive modifications and there has often been gradual return to what had been developed by reason from experience from the
classical Roman Law to the nineteenth century. As to the bill of rights,
(Civil Code, Section 5) which follows the well known lines of modern
constitutions, it is enough to say that it can be abrogated as to any provision by the government at any time. 62
Parallel to the hierarchy of courts there is a hierarchy of government
attorneys. The federal attorney general, independent of the Ministry
of Justice, is elected by the Supreme Soviet for seven years. He appoints
the attorneys for the republics, regions, and provinces, and approves
appointments of district attorneys. He has "supreme supervisory power
over the strict execution of the laws by all Ministries and their agen57
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cies, all public officials, and citizens." 63 The local government attorneys
are independent of local authorities, and subordinate only to the attorney general of the Soviet Union. Thus the government attorneys are
a centralized machinery for supervising the details of law enforcement.
The power goes from top to bottom. Approval of a government attorney, for example, is a sufficient warrant for arrest. 64 Government
attorneys have what is called a supervisory power over the administration of justice. They not only serve as public prosecutors but they may
intervene in any civil suit at any time. They can take appeals on their
own motion and may proceed ex officio for reopening of a case in which
a court has rendered a final decision. Every appellate court must hear
the opinion of a competent government attorney before rendering a
decision on appeal. They have much more than the powers of prosecutors. They have statutory authority to supervise activities of the l\1inistry of the Interior which the judges do not have. The government
attorneys also have what is called general supervisory power by virtue
of which they watch administration, particularly administration by local
authorities, to see to it that it is carried on according to law. They may
take part in the deliberations of local Soviets, though they cannot vote.
They may examine any resolution of local authorities and may protest
against resolutions of the local Soviets of their districts, if they consider
them contrary to law. Such protests are filed with the next higher
authority. 65 The government attorney with supervisory power is a
reverting to provincial attorneys, an institution of absolutist imperial
Russia. At the beginning of the Soviet regime they were abolished
along with the pre-revolutionary courts. They were provided for in
1927, a federal attorney general was provided for in 1933 and giv~n
power of supervision over government attorneys, and in 1936 they were
organized as a federal hierarchy. 00 The development of this highly
centralized bureaucratic machinery of insuring observance of law as
the will of the ruling power, is one of many phenomena suggesting that
Russia is the old absolute Russia under new masters.
Soviet rejection of eA'Perience and seeking to strike out new paths
failed, as in so many other cases, in attempting the oft-repeated experiment of eliminating professional agents for litigation and advocates.
At the outset in 1918 a special body of legal representatives, both prosecutors and defenders, were put on a monthly salary, fees to be paid by
68 P. 846.
64 Ibid.
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66 Pp.

847, 849.
849-850.

MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 50

the parties to the state treasury. This attempt to put all litigants on complete equality by providing a salaried advocate for each had to be given
up. As it turned out an accused would not only fee his own assigned
advocate to do his best but as well the prosecutor's advocate to do as little
as he could. It became necessary to dismiss the whole panel. In 1920
another experiment was tried. The court in its discretion was allowed
to permit counsel, and in that case to draft counsel from a list drawn up
by the local Soviet. Counsel for the defense was paid a per diem from
the treasury. In civil cases the parties could be represented by next of
kin. 67 A movement toward a profession of lawyers has gone on. The
government has not gone so far as to allow a free self governing profession nor lost its distrust of fixing of lawyer's fees by agreement between
lawyer and client. But in one form or another much of this has come in.
There has been fluctuation. At one time it was allowable for a client
to select a lawyer and agree upon a fee, at another this was restricted.
The organizations of lawyers (called by the Roman-law term for associations-collegia) were sometimes given more and sometimes less independence. Lawyers were required to practice collectively in groups as
legal-aid offices or allowed to practice individually. In the collegia the
fees collected were at one time pooled and at another apportioned with
reference to the personal effort and qualifications of individual lawyers.
The title "advocate" was restored in 1939. But under the statute of that
year the status of the lawyer is still not entirely systematized. The practice of law is regulated in a ·way that suggests a free profession. A committee elected by what we may call members of the profession admits
graduates of law schools and persons of judicial experience to membership in the collegium of advocates. But the Federal Minister of Justice
and the Ministers of Justice of the republics may veto or overrule admission. Collegia of advocates are established in the regions and republics. The statute defines them as voluntary associations of persons
engaged in exercise of the legal profession. · Other persons, however,
may practice by special license from the Minister of Justice. Instead
of being paid salaries by the government, advocates receive fees from
their clients according to a schedule made by the Minister of Justice.
They are not eligible to any position with the government except as
teachers or officials chosen by election. This is one side. But the bulk
of what is done by lawyers falls to specially organized legal aid offices.
67P.
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These operate under the supervision of an advocate appointed as Director by a committee of what we may call the bar. The Director distributes cases among the members of the bureaus and determines the
fees according to the Minister's schedule. A member of a collegium is
subject to discipline as a laborer. He must appear at the office at certain
times and sign in. 68
A characteristic feature of the soviet polity which deserves special
mention is growth of ex officio administrative reopening of cases after
final judgment in the court. In substance it comes to be the real appel. late proceeding to which the appeal is only a preliminary. As Dr.
Gsovski puts it: "The appellate procedure begins in an open session
with the participation of the litigants, but it may then go on indefinitely
behind closed doors as a purely internal concern of the government attorneys and courts." 69 Thus civil procedure becomes administrative, not
judicial.
Communists have had a great deal to say about capitalist exploitation of the workers for the benefit of the bourgeois. But by the same
token and with much more truth we may speak of soviet exploitation
of farmers and laborers for the benefit of an official and military class.
The soviet polity is proclaimed to be a regime of control by the toilers.
It is actually one of control of the toilers by an office-holding class. 70
As to exploitation of labor, managers are liable to prosecution for failure
to discharge workers for violations of labor discipline. 71 Workers are
subject to disciplinary penalties for tardiness and loafing on the job,
to criminal prosecution for absenteeism and to deductions from wages
for negligent damage to or loss of government property. There has been
continual increase in the penalties for absenteeism, tardiness and
breaches of labor discipline. Freezing in the job and compulsory transfer of employees were introduced in 1940 and seem to have become
permanent features of the soviet labor polity. 72 What we should think
trivial infractions of discipline entail the most serious consequences administratively imposed with no possibility of appeal. 73 Collective bargaining as to wages has been given up and government control substituted.74 Employment may be by administrative order and failure to
take it is treated as criminal absenteeism entailing drastic penalties. 75
68 Pp. 853-855.
69 P. 908.

70 That such a class has been growing
up, see pp. 141-144, 744-745.
11P.99.

12 Ibid., pp.

828-829.

73 Pp. 802, 816, 819.
74 Pp. 806-814.
75P. 800.

112

M1cmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

In some branches the management has special disciplinary power and
the worker has no recourse to courts or conciliation boards but has only
appeal to the administrative superior of the manager.76 If the worker's
product does not satisfy the requirements laid down for it, his wages are
reduced according to a rate fixed by the management.77 If the employee causes damages to the employer, and the ultimate and real employer is the government, the employee is subject to heavy liability both
in damages and penal, with no more protection for him than an "objection" which may take the matter to superior management. 78 Soviet
labor law is mostly criminal law. A strike would be the serious crime
. "
of "b
a sentee1sm.
As to exploitation of farmers, urban industry is considered to set
the pace for farming. Soviet farms are to be "grain and meat factories."79 Penal legislation has made possible administrative imposition
of very severe penalties. Help by those not of the collective farm is
permitted only "when urgent operations cannot be performed in time
by the members working at full speed." 80 The farmer is as firmly held
to the collective farm as the medieval cottager to the lord's estate. To
leave the farm or be transferred to another he must obtain consent of
the governing authority of the farm and also of the local administrative
authority, the head of the district land office. He must stay on the collective farm or lose everything and while there must work up to a required standard, in fixing which he has no effective voice. He is subjected to what is very like involuntary servitude with the alternative of
starvation. One of the staple penalties for infraction of collective-farm
discipline is expulsion from the farm. Soviet writers admit that such expulsion is a practical condemnation to starvation.81 Expulsion may not
be contested in court. Complaints as to expulsion are decided by administrative authorities whose ruthlessness is spoken of by Soviet writers
themselves.82 I repeat, this book has value and timeliness not only for
lawyers and teachers and students of comparative law but for the public
generally. It is clearly written and may be understood by the intelligent layman. It may well be read and pondered by all who are or
should be thinking about a polity now urged aggressively throughout
the world, which makes confident pretenses not borne out by what it
really is and does.
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